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ABSTRACT
This study draws from the pay-communication and organizational-justice
literature to evaluate the effectiveness of manager/employee pay conversations in a large,
North-American insurance company. Collecting survey data from 2230 randomly chosen
employees across all managerial levels, tenure, and age groups it has been found that pay
conversation quality, assessed by measuring the extent which specific, recommended
content was addressed, and best-practice recommendations were followed, affects
perceptions of procedural and informational justice, controlling for distributive justice. A
higher-order composite of the justice dimension was also positively related to the
organization’s definition of employee engagement and turnover intentions. The study’s
implication for organizational practice, recommendations around effective messaging, as
well as existing limitations, are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
With an ever-accelerating pace and increased complexity of business
environments, organizations increasingly separate themselves from each other through
the ability to continuously change and improve processes (Teece, 2007). Component of
the efforts to improve is a constant evaluation of existing processes, not only concerning
core-business functions of an organization, but also human resources practices.

The Organization
The following study has been completed for a large, North-American company in
the insurance industry, with about 45,000 employees across the family of companies
based in the Midwest of the United States. The majority of employees are located in the
United States. While the enterprise has subsidiaries in other countries and regions, only
the employees located in the United States were part of this study.

The Setting
Every year, the organization adjusts the individual base compensation of
employees based on overall organizational results and individual employee performance.
How much of an increase each employee receives is mostly under the discretion of the
specific departments and teams and is administered through managers to employees
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directly, within boundaries and rules set by the corporate compensation department in
conjunction with the organization’s senior leadership. Boundaries were set using salaryband ranges that provided managers with soft targets when deciding annual base-pay
increases. Soft, because managers could exceed suggested limits if they felt the
employee was deserving of a higher than suggested base pay based on her or his value to
the organization. This flexibility allowed managers to individualize their employees’
increase based on the individual situation and factors. Once a decision was made,
managers turn to communicate the base increase to the employee via a personal one-onone conversation that summarizes the past accomplishments to link the increase with the
work completed through the past year.
For the 2019 increase cycle, the organization decided to change some of the
factors of this process. First, salary-band ranges, a metric that provided managers with
information on an employee’s compensation relative to other employees within the same
salary band, were replaced by market ranges as the prominent metric for pay-decisions.
Salary-band ranges continue to be used as the minimum and maximum pay allowed
within a specific salary band. Market ranges, shift the comparison group from employees
within a specific salary band within the organization to employees with similar job duties
within the specific (external) job market. The shift provides more control to managers to
make compensation decisions consistent with the organization's pay philosophy. To
obtain market ranges, the compensation department matches internal jobs with external
information, usually provided by compensation surveys from significant management
advisory and consulting companies.
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Second, the market-range information moved from a soft to a hard target,
meaning that the limits set by the organization are now binding limits that cannot be
surpassed or fallen short. Managers with employees below target are recommended to
provide more substantial increases to drive employee’s compensation to be more
competitive to market over time. On the flip side, employees with base compensation
above the target become ineligible for an increase.
From these changes arose an additional need for managers to communicate their
decisions in more detail. On the one hand, employee conversations could be more
favorable with employees that received a more substantial increase than expected because
they were below or at the lower end of the target. On the other hand, employees that
exceeded, or were close to the upper end of the target were in need for a more significant
explanation of why their increase was smaller than expected, or why they would not get
an increase at all. The compensation department provided a comprehensive package of
recommended topics and best practices, and information for managers to prepare them
for these, at times, painful discussions. Additionally, to increase transparency, employees
were informed on their base-compensation facts, including their market-range percentile
via an individualized report that serves as the foundation of the manager-employee
discussion.

CHAPTER 2
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Original Evaluation Request
The new facets of the compensation system resulted in an increased emphasis on
the manager/employee conversation to communicate the changes to employees and to
explain potential consequences to individual employees’ merit increases. The research
project at hand started in January 2019 with the request to evaluate the quality of
manager/employee conversations with their employees via a survey to a subset of the
organization. More specifically, the project aimed to discover whether managers do a
good job explaining the changes in a way that resonates positively with their subordinates
(i.e., fosters change acceptance). The compensation department additionally conducted a
yearly survey that evaluates the quality of guiding materials and whether managers
perceive the support as adequate and helpful when planning and deciding annual merit
increases. An effective merit-increase process requires managers that understand the
system and the guardrails in place that give them leeway to make decisions. A
comprehensive set of materials form the foundation to ensure that managers feel fully
supported and are equipped with the information to make decisions in the best interest of
the organization. The two surveys, in combination, would provide the capability for the
compensation department to continuously improve their processes and documents.
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Expanding the Scope
Upon initial conversation between the author of this document and the client, a
plan was drafted that would address the questions initially raised. Due to the familiarity
of the author with the underlying concepts of pay communication and compensation, an
approach was presented to the client that would expand the scope from an evaluation –
based approach (“how are we doing? Do we have a problem?”) to an impact-based
approach (“Does our program impact employees as intended”). Two central arguments
served as a reason to look at the initial question from a different perspective. First, an
impact-based approach evaluates the effectiveness of a program against organizational
outcomes such as employee engagement and intention to stay with the organization.
Second, given the sensitive nature of compensation for the employee-organization
relationship, the impact-based approach focuses on the effect of the initiative on
employees rather than the actions are taken themselves.
Generally, Human Resources makes increasing attempts to better quantify their
services by measuring the impact of an initiative on the business, rather than solely
analyzing individual components (e.g., participant satisfaction to a training module). In
essence, measuring whether managers do a good job conveying and explaining the
changes to employees is essential. Still, it does not tell us anything about employees’
reaction to the explanation itself. Kirkpatrick (1994) describes a blueprint for the
evaluation of training along four distinct levels: Reaction, Learning, Behavior, and
Results. While this is a widely known framework in the training-space, the framework
can also be successfully applied to program-evaluation itself. Analog to Kirkpatrick’s
four levels, measuring the business impact would constitute a Level-4 evaluation,
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whereas measuring manager's successful behaviors would constitute a Level-3
evaluation. Both pieces of information are of importance to the organization. Level-3
information helps decision-makers to identify shortcomings but won’t provide
information about whether the initiative or process is overall successful. A Level-4
measurement would be required to find a conclusive answer to that question. The lack of
a Level-4 objective in the initial request would have been a shortcoming that would have
led to incomplete information on the program's effectiveness.

Project Questions
As described in the expanded scope section, the central question to be answered is
whether manager/employee conversations have the intended main effect on employees,
that is, provide an explanation for the base-pay increase decision that is satisfactory to the
employee. As described in the upcoming literature review, compensation is a delicate
matter for employees because it is at the heart of the employee-employer relationship.
Changes to compensation are often highly scrutinized, and decisions that are perceived as
unjust or unfair may damage the relationship beyond repair. The importance of the
manager/employee conversations increases as the favorability of the decision for the
employee decreases. An explanation of the results and procedures employed to make
decisions provides employees with reference points that put decisions in context and,
conversely, may positively influence employees’ perceptions of being treated fairly. If
managers fail to be effective communicators, the results for the organization could be
lowered engagement and heightened turnover as employees cope with their negative
perceptions of fairness. The concept of fairness will be defined at a later point in this
study.
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Project Question 1a: Are manager/employee conversations effective in improving
employee’s perception of fairness?



Project Question 1b: Provided that the conversations are indeed effective in
improving employees’ perceptions of fairness, do employees who indicated better
conversations and higher satisfaction also display higher engagement and intendto-stay results in the enterprise-wide engagement survey?
Another objective involves managers conveying the changes to the compensation

guidelines and the impact on employees in an understandable manner. That includes
providing and explaining tangible compensation information such as new salary and
individual employee market ranges. The organization hypothesizes that detailed change
explanations will have positive effects on how likely employees deem the base-pay
decision as satisfactory. To support managers, the organization provides a set of
recommended topics and best practices to focus on the manager/employee conversation.
Managers are recommended to explain the total compensation package, cover the new
market-range metric, how it is derived, how it is being used, and the impact of the metric
as a guardrail for pay-increase decisions. Additionally, the compensation department
recommended that managers jointly review an employee’s contribution through the past
year, but put the contributions in context to the base-pay decision, and leave room for the
employee to ask questions. The compensation department is interested in the
effectiveness of these best practices in providing necessary information and in improving
employee’s evaluation of the compensation-increase process and the information that the
organization provides.
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 Project Question 2: Do employees understand the changes to the compensation
guidelines communicated through their managers?


Project Question 3: How effective are the provided best practices in influencing
employee’s evaluation of the process and the information they receive?
The author recommended an approach to answer these questions sufficiently,

which is based on the current literature in the field of pay communication. This approach
will be briefly summarized in Chapter 3.

CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW
Compensation
Compensation is physical or mental labor in exchange for monetary or nonmonetary rewards. This transactional relationship is the heart of most employment
agreements between individuals and organizations. Salaries, wages, and benefits are the
most critical outputs that organizations deliver to employees. They accomplish a plethora
of secondary functions, besides just fulfilling the transactional component of the
agreement mentioned above, such as the communication of value, recognition, directing
and motivating desirable (for the organization) behaviors, and rewarding performance
(Berger & Berger, 2008). The importance of compensation as a factor and component to
overall organizational effectiveness through the attraction, motivation, and retention of
employees has often been labeled critical for organizations. Consequently, effective
compensation systems can be a real competitive advantage (Gerhart, 2000; Guest, 2011).
From an employee perspective, compensation is also a critical job factor (Gerhart &
Rynes, 2003) that represents the primary exchange medium for the labor or human capital
provided (Andersson-Straberg, Sverke, & Hellgren, 2007; Lawler, 2000), a form of
recognition (Berger & Berger, 2008), a part of the performance management and
feedback process (Aguinis, 2009) and a determinant of social status (Andersson-Straberg
et al., 2007).
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Given the importance of compensation for organizations and employees alike, it is
essential to understand how employees form perceptions of equitable compensation and
how these perceptions may influence behavior. The literature around equity theory,
organizational justice perceptions, and pay communication can be used to understand the
effects of the change on the workforce from an industrial/organizational psychology
perspective.

Reaction to Compensation
Equity Theory
Equity theory (Adams, 1965) plays a foundational role in the compensation
literature (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010). Its theoretical foundation is
derived from social exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Gouldner, 1960). Social Exchange
theory posits that relationships and exchanges are formed and negotiated by individual
cost-benefit analyses. Additionally, equity theory was influenced by cognitive
dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957) that states that individuals drive to achieve
consistency between their attitudes and behaviors. The dissonance between actions and
behaviors will result in action by the individual aimed to restore balance and consistency.
Finally, equity theory asserts that every individual employee continuously
compares his or her inputs such as education, effort, time spent, labor, performance, and
loyalty to the respective organizational outcomes such as compensation, promotion
opportunities, social relationships, and recognition (Day, 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al.,
2010). Those comparisons, however, cannot be made in a vacuum. Employees cannot
compare their inputs and outputs to themselves. Instead, employees use referent others
(coworkers, other employees, workers, inside and outside of the organization) to assess
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their situation. When employees perceive the balance (or ratio) between individual
inputs and outputs to be equal to the inputs and outputs of their respective referent others,
the employee feels equity. The relationship is demonstrated by the equation depicted in
Figure 1a.

Figure 1a
Perceived Equity

Any perceived imbalance would consequently be labeled inequity, as depicted in
Figure 1b. It is essential to point out that inequity does not automatically have negative
consequences. It can be positive or negative. An employee who just learned that he is
being compensated twenty-five percent more than his colleague while performing similar
tasks at similar quality and quantity perceives negative inequity (being over rewarded). In
contrast, a colleague who receives twenty-five percent less for the same work as their
comparison colleague experiences positive inequity (under-rewarded), should he or she
get to learn of the pay gap (Kreitner & Kinicki, 2001). This example assumes that both
parties involved do the same job, at the same quality, and that the 25 percent difference is
actual. Hence, objective and perceived inequity align.
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Figure 1b
Perceived Inequity

It is the subjective assessment of the individual that matters more than the
objective information, regardless of erroneous assumptions, or incomplete information
that led to false conclusions. Perceived and objective equity rarely fit together neatly.
Employees differ significantly in the use and weighing of input and output criteria used
for their comparison. As a result, employees tend to overemphasize their strengths over
weaknesses and how both form collective employee inputs (Lawler, 1966). In
combination with a general overestimation of own performance and achievements over
that of peers and colleagues, perceived negative inequity is an outcome that is more likely
(Kane & Lawler, 1979). Milkovich and Newman (2005) emphasize that money, with its
centrality mentioned above to the employer-employee relationship, usually plays a vital
role in the equation of inputs, outputs, and referent – other comparisons. When
comparing outputs, or gain, employees usually base most of their evaluation on the
comparison of compensation to their peers and coworkers. Other factors, such as
preferential treatment by superiors, better standing within the organization, and other,
non-quantifiable benefits generally have less of an impact on the overall evaluation.
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If positive inequity is perceived as the outcome of the referent-other comparison,
the employee will try to restore balance. That can be achieved through the following
options: Either equity can be restored by reducing inputs (e.g., by withdrawal,
absenteeism, reduced effort), trying to maximize the outputs (e.g., by complaining to a
supervisor, asking for a raise, concerted actions), or by looking for other employment
opportunities (Fisher, Schoenfeldt, & Shaw, 1999) with more favorable equity
evaluations. Some employees may even resort to deviant behaviors such as stealing or
sabotaging as a consequence when equity is unlikely to be restored, and other options are
scarce (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). Perceived negative inequity (a feeling of being over
rewarded), conversely, is less common, and outcomes are less severe because the
employee is directly benefitting from the inequity. Often, employees that feel negative
inequity either perceive their performance to be higher and locus of control to be greater
in comparison to colleagues (Thierry, 1998). However, employees may also feel guilt or
anxiety (Homans, 1961; Jaques, 1961).
Fairness
While equity theory aids the understanding of motivational effects of pay
communication, it does not go far enough to explore the attitudinal dimension of
employees. It is essential to connect individual equity evaluations with resulting
perceptions of fairness to understand the effects of pay communication on employee
attitudes. Equity theory explained that fairness is determined by relative evaluations of
one’s input and outcomes in comparison to referent others (Adams, 1965). This theorem
gives rise to more specific theoretical frameworks that explain the subsequent evaluations
of perceived inequity as well as the psychological consequences that affect the individual
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and, in sum, the organization. Two concepts, uncertainty reduction theory (Lind & Van
den Bos, 2002), also sometimes referred to as fairness heuristic theory (Lind, 2001), and
organizational justice (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001) are crucial
components in understanding effects of compensation on employee behavior.
At its heart, uncertainty reduction theory describes mental shortcuts, heuristics,
that individuals utilize to cope with the absence of crucial information to make evaluative
judgments (Lind & Van den Bos, 2001). The more uncertain a situation, the more crucial
information is missing to base judgments upon, and the more individuals seem to rely on
the use of mental shortcuts. Lind and Van den Bos (2002) argue that fairness is
particularly important in uncertain situations because being treated fairly induces
confidence in good outcomes while the opposite amplifies feelings of uneasiness. As
such, fairness perceptions direct an individual’s affective reaction in situations of
uncertainty. Restricting the flow of information concerning compensation introduces
various degrees of uncertainty to the environment and, thus, forces individuals to rely on
their shortcuts, heuristics, and ultimately fairness perceptions of the organization to
inform critical judgments of their equity evaluation. In most privately-owned
organizations, compensation information is restricted to employees in some form.
Restrictions may range from complete secrecy, where employees only know their
compensation but are generally not aware of the factors that go into it and are either
actively or passively encouraged not to share information to complete openness, where
organizations may choose to communicate as much compensation information as legally
possible. Most organizations fall somewhere in between this range, making some
information available while restricting other critical factors.
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Organizational Justice
Uncertainty reduction theory helps to understand the importance of fairness
perceptions. It does, however, very little to illuminate fairness perceptions as a construct,
which is of critical importance to explore the consequences of such evaluations.
Organizational justice represents a more fine-grained approach that describes fairness
perceptions in more detail while trying to interpret and explain the impact of perceptions
in organizational settings (Colquitt, 2001; Greenberg, 1990b). Over the years, the field of
organizational justice has seen a substantial amount of research and has grown from a
unidimensional theory to a multidimensional construct with four distinct dimensions
(Colquitt, 2012):


Distributive Justice (Adams, 1965), fairness perceptions associated with outcomes,



Procedural Justice (Thibaut & Walker, 1975), fairness perceptions associated with
the process that lead to the outcomes,



Informational Justice (Bies & Moag, 1986), fairness perceptions associated with
the information provided,



Interpersonal justice ((Bies & Moag, 1986; Greenberg, 1990a, 1993), fairness
perceptions associated with the interpersonal treatment.
Generally, the link between justice perceptions and individual employee outcomes

and attitudes are complementary. Employees who feel treated fairly and equitably will
subsequently have more positive attitudes towards the organization and, thus, are more
likely to be more compliant and behave in manners benefiting the collective of the
organization (Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001). Conversely, unfavorable evaluations of
fairness are more likely to result in negative attitudes with corresponding behaviors
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characterized by a lack of cooperation and by selfishness (Cohen-Charash & Spector,
2001). To understand how pay-communication impacts the organization, a deeper
understanding of the organizational justice construct is warranted. It provides a vital link
between practice (degree of pay communication) and organizational outcome (Marasi,
2014). The work will explain the four dimensions of organizational justice to gain a
deeper understanding of organizational justice; then, their impact to pay communication
will be discussed.
Distributive Justice
The perception of being compensated or rewarded fairly (in comparison to others)
is referred to as distributive justice. The concept is derived from Adam’s equity theory
(Adams, 1965), discussed above. Hence, people are concerned with the subjective,
relative fairness of the allocated rewards more than they are concerned with the absolute
level of rewards. While Adam’s proposed the equity allocation principle as the basis of
fairness evaluations, other researchers, most notably Leventhal (1976), proposed other
potential principles based on “equality” and “need.” Different contexts (family, work,
society), goals (maximum performance, group harmony), or motives (self-interest,
altruism) seem to activate different allocations principles within the individual and
subsequently change the perception of distributive justice accordingly (Colquitt et al.,
2001; Deutsch, 1975).
Additionally, Gilliland (1993) noted that individuals might use different allocation
principles within the same context. Despite the sense of objectivity that these allocation
principles evoke, the evaluation of whether an outcome is perceived as fair is a subjective
process. Thus, research that touches the realm of distributive justice best includes
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measures to collect individual perceptions because they cannot be inferred from other
variables with certainty.
Procedural Justice
Distributive justice is only one facet of a multidimensional construct
(organizational justice) that is comprised of three additional facets, namely procedural,
informational, and interpersonal justice (Colquitt, 2012; Colquitt et al., 2001). Having its
origins in the field of legal proceedings, Thibaut and Walker (1975) first described
procedural justice as process control while explaining the positive effects of arbitration
and mediation. Individuals were willing to give up control over the outcome of a
procedure as long as they had the means to influence the procedure itself. This effect is
also known as “fair process” or “voice” and has been frequently researched (e.g., Folger,
1977; Lind & Tyler, 1988). Leventhal subsequently applied the lessons learned in the
field of litigation to an organizational setting (Leventhal, 1980; Leventhal, Karuza, &
Fry, 1980). As a result, Leventhal developed six criteria that should be met for a
procedure to be perceived as fair. Procedures should:


Be applied consistently across all individuals and time



Be free of bias and vested interest in a particular outcome



Ensure that the information used for decision making is accurate



Include a method to complain about, appeal, or correct flawed or wrong decisions



Be in accordance with personal or universal standards of ethics and morals



Consider the opinions of individuals and groups that are affected by it (voice
effect).
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Adherence to the guideline of procedural justice is believed to coincide with a
multitude of positive outcomes on the individual and organizational level such as
increased satisfaction, higher acceptance of rules (e.g., Tyler & Bies, 1990; Tyler &
Folger, 1980), increased satisfaction with results (e.g., Folger & Konovsky, 1989;
LaTour, 1978; Lind, Walker, Kurtz, Musante, & Thibaut, 1980), and increased
citizenship behaviors (e.g., Fahr, Podsakoff, & Organ, 1990; Kamdar, McAllister, &
Turban, 2006; Moorman, Niehoff, & Organ, 1993; Tyler & Degoey, 1995; Zeinabadi &
Salehi, 2011).
Informational and Interpersonal Justice
The most recent advance in the justice literature was introduced by Bies and
Moag (1986) through the addition of the final components, informational and
interpersonal justice. The focus of these dimensions is the quality of social interactions
between the individual and the organization or its representatives (supervisors, etc.) that
can shape justice perceptions. It should be noted that the exact labeling of these
dimensions is subject to an ongoing academic debate. Bies and Moag (1986) introduced
informational and interpersonal justice as one dimension labeled interactional justice.
Greenberg (1990a) subsequently split interactional justice into an explanation and
sensitivity component, which was later re-labeled interpersonal and informational justice
(Greenberg, 1993). Due to its proximity to procedural justice, it was long debated
whether informational and interpersonal justice are a standalone facet or just separate
sub-facets of procedural justice (e.g., Aquino, 1995; Niehoff & Moorman, 1993;
Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). Recent work by Colquitt (2001) indicates a preference for
four distinct factors and provided empirical support for the unique value of interpersonal
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and informational justice. Thus, the author of this work preferred to use informational
and interpersonal justice as separate dimensions.
Bies and Moag (1986) formerly comprised the construct of four criteria:
justification: truthfulness, respect, and propriety. Justification refers to how adequately a
particular outcome was explained, while truthfulness describes the accuracy and honesty
of the justification. Employees that are given an accurate, timely, and complete
explanation of procedures and outcomes are more likely to view them as fair (AnderssonStraberg et al., 2007). Respect refers to whether the individual was treated with dignity
and sincerity, and propriety suggests that the presentation of outcomes or procedures is
free of biases, prejudicial statements, and based on accurate information (Scott, Colquitt,
& Zapata-Phelan, 2007). Greenberg’s (1993) split follows the four criteria by Bies and
Moag (1986) by including respect and propriety in the interpersonal category, and
justification and truthfulness in the informational category (Greenberg, 1993). More
information on the linkages in section 3.3.3.
Outcomes of Types of Organizational Justice
Organizational research over the last decades has firmly established
organizational justice as an essential mechanism through which necessary employee
attitudes are formed. Most notably, Colquitt et al. (2001) conducted a meta-analytic
review that included 183 studies between 1975 and 1999. Results firmly relate the four
dimensions of organizational justice to critical organizational outcomes such as job
satisfaction, organizational commitment, performance, organizational citizenship
behaviors, and withdrawal, among others. Additionally, it is one of several antecedents
of work engagements in recent studies (Ghosh, Rai, & Sinha, 2014; Moliner, Martinez-
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Tur, Ramos, Peiró, & Cropanzano, 2008; Saks, 2006). Before the role of organizational
justice for this study is discussed in detail, it is important to introduce pay communication
to the discussion first.

Pay Communication
Definition
Pay communication, or pay secrecy which it was often referred to, was viewed by
early literature as an organizational practice that aimed to restrict the amount of
information employees could potentially access about the compensation of coworkers
(Burroughs, 1982; Colella, Paetzold, Zardkoohi, & Wesson, 2007; Thompson & Pronsky,
1975). As Marasi and Bennett (2016) pointed out, pay secrecy was treated like an “allor-nothing” type of concept. Either organization employed a policy of total secrecy or
complete openness. This labeling does not do justice to the complexity of the construct.
Hence, the term pay communication is predominantly used nowadays, which treats
complete secrecy and openness as two extreme ends of a continuum. The paradigm shift
accurately reflects organizational practice as the use and degree of pay secrecy policies
vary widely from employer to employer (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992; Milkovich &
Newman, 2005). To one end, pay secrecy, as discussed earlier, aims at prohibiting
employees from discussing aspects of their compensation amongst themselves as well as
to outsiders. In this regard, it is essential to notice that neither the organization is actively
communicating compensation-relevant information, nor are employees permitted to
communicate their salary to others. The result is near-zero communication and no
availability of information. On the other end of the spectrum, pay openness does not only
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allow employees to disclose their individual information, the organization proactively
discloses pay information in regular intervals (Marasi, 2014).
Substantiated Outcomes of Pay Communication
Pay communication has a mixed track record of clearly substantiated results. One
of the first scholars to extensively investigate pay communication, or pay secrecy, which
it was called at that time, was Lawler III. Beginning with a series of studies in 1965 and
1966 (Lawler, 1965a; Lawler, 1965b; Lawler, 1966), Lawler focused initially on the
effects of pay secrecy policies on the accuracy of referent-other comparisons of lowerand middle-level managers. Results demonstrated that managers in both public and
private sectors consistently overestimated the pay of subordinates and peers. Public
sector managers were more accurate in their comparisons, which, according to Lawler
(Lawler, 1965a; Lawler, 1965b), can be explained with the increased amount of salary
information public managers have to their disposal compared to the private sector
organizations. The study demonstrated that the absence of tangible information increases
the likelihood of inaccurate pay estimations that, in turn, produce inaccurate referentother comparisons. The result is perceived pay compression for managers (since they
overestimate the compensation of their subordinates and peers) that leads to paying
dissatisfaction and subsequently, according to Lawler (1965a), reduced motivation to
perform and to be promoted.
Lawler was able to replicate his results in a follow-up study (Lawler, 1967) with
varying research design. Milkovich and Anderson (1972) executed a similar study in an
organization that utilized a less restrictive pay communication strategy (in comparison to
Lawler’s studies, whose organization maintained complete secrecy) in that some
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managerial information was available and found similar results. In an additional followup study, Lawler (1972) additionally incorporated theoretical foundations (e.g., social
comparison theory, equity theory) for hypothesis building and interpretation. While the
same over/underestimation pattern was once again observed, pay satisfaction was
affected by peer and subordinate pay overestimation. Contrary to results Lawler obtained
from previous studies (Lawler, 1967).
Moreover, pay satisfaction was negatively related to the accuracy of pay
estimations, self/other pay differentials, and perceived standing in the organization
relative to others. Lawler (1972) also uncovered that Managers consistently
overestimated superiors’ size and frequency of pay raises and largely ignored their own,
individual pay raise characteristics. Effects of the erroneous estimation reach beyond
equity evaluations. Since pay raises are often tied to performance feedback, especially in
organizations with a stronger emphasis on pay-for-performance, managers who
overestimated their superior's raises interpreted their performance feedback as more
negative. Mahoney and Weitzel (1978) were able to observe similar results in their
replication of Lawler’s (1972) study.
Pay Communication, Organizational Justice
Perceptions and Organizational Outcomes
In 2007, Colella et al. (2007) reviewed the state of the pay communication
literature that summarized cost, benefits, and tradeoffs for organizations that employ pay
secrecy. Among the benefits are greater organizational control to maintain a workplace
free of conflict, enhanced privacy for employees, and lowered risk of turnover due to
compensation. The costs of such a policy are lowered perceptions of fairness, decreased
employee task motivation, specifically in pay-for-performance situations, and labor
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market inefficiencies. One of the costs associated with pay secrecy described by Colella
et al. (2007), decreased task motivation, was not substantiated through empirical research
at the time of the publication and, thus, only a hypothesis. Bamberger and Belogolovsky
(2010) generated and tested a moderated-mediation model aimed to explore the validity
of the proposed adverse effects of pay secrecy policies on individual task performance
(see Figure 2).

Figure 2
Bamberger and Belogolovsky (2010) Proposed Model

Results of the experimental study using undergraduate students revealed no direct
effect of pay communication on task performance. However, tolerance for inequity did
moderate the relationship mentioned above in the expected fashion as individuals with
lower tolerance experienced more negative effects on task performance in a pay secrecy
condition. Additionally, instrumentality perceptions mediated the relationship between
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pay communication and task performance when tolerance for inequity was included as a
moderator. Hence, the study demonstrated the adverse effects specific pay
communication strategies might have for certain populations.
The non-significant findings of the mediating effects of procedural and
informational fairness on task performance were surprising, given the meta-analytic
findings of Colquitt et al. (2001). Bamberger and Belogolovsky (2010) explained the
results with an overpowering effect of instrumentality perceptions in explaining the
already low variance in task performance. Thus, given the sample size of the study and
the experimental conditions, the results do not indicate that these types of justice
perceptions may be excluded from future research, given the numerous limitations of the
study (e.g., participants compensation was too low to cause meaningful justice reactions
for participants). Allocation of the already limited rewards was based on an objectively
measured performance metric that ensured maximum pay-for-performance allocation
validity. Given the issues organizations and scientists experience with performance
measurement alike due to the numerous contextual factors (Pulakos & O’Leary, 2011),
one can reasonably expect a more significant role of justice perceptions in real-world,
organizational settings where resource allocation is imperfect. On top of that, the
interaction between participants in this simulation (two hours) may not have been enough
for the development of realistic coworker dynamics that are the basis for the referentother comparisons.
Building on the work of Noy (2007), Colella et al. (2007), and Bamberger and
Belogolovsky (2010), Marasi’s study aimed to explore the effects of pay communication
on workplace deviance. Marasi (2014) build her central hypothesis on the argument that
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pay secrecy fosters erroneous referent-other comparisons as accurate information upon
which to base-pay estimations is unavailable. Since employees tend to overestimate
peer-level compensation, an escalation of feelings of unfairness and negative emotions
becomes more likely. Coupled with the uncertainty that arises when information is being
withheld because it is “secret,” employees are hypothesized to use workplace deviance as
a method to offset or retaliate against the negative emotions created by the environment.
Since this relationship is partially based on fairness perceptions, Marasi (2014) included
organizational justice dimensions and perceptions of organizational and managerial trust
as possible mediators (see Figure 3).

Figure 3
Marasi’s (2014) Proposed Relationships

Results of the study indicated significance for the pay communication, justice
perception, deviance interaction as described, with R2 being of a small size. As for
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perceptions of trust, managerial trust significantly mediated the pay communication
deviance relationship while organizational trust did not. This study establishes
organizational justice as a key mediator in the pay-communication literature.
Noy’s (2007) work on a perceived organizational pay secrecy scale (POPS)
provides additional evidence on the relationship between justice perceptions and pay
communication. His findings supported the theorized, inverse relationship of pay secrecy
and informational justice but failed to demonstrate a relationship between POPS and
distributive justice. Day (2007), on the other hand, found distributive justice to be the
most influential mediator in the relationship between pay communication and pay
satisfaction.
As explained earlier, there is little doubt that distributive justice is an essential
construct in the pay communication space based on the roots in equity theory. How
much pay an employee receives and where it puts him or her in comparison to referent
others (e.g., peers) is an essential driver of justice perceptions. The results of Noy (2007)
and Day (2007) demonstrate distributive justice is likely not a mediator, but rather a
moderator that influences the relationship between pay communication and its outcomes.
Employees may be influenced in their perception of whether they are compensated
equitably, based on the amount of compensation-related information their organization
provides. The overarching, most important decision factor, however, is the amount of
compensation about what the individual employee deems equitable. Consistent with this
finding, Marasi (2014) theorized distributive justice to be a moderator in the relationship
between pay communication and workplace deviance, mediated by informational and
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procedural justice. In this relationship, distributive justice moderates the relationship
between informational and procedural justice and workplace deviance.
Marasi (2014) argues, based on equity theory (Adams, 1965), that unfavorable
referent-other comparisons result in negative distributive-justice perceptions, and,
subsequently, feelings of anger, tension, and relative deprivation (Homans, 1961; Jaques,
1961), feelings directly associated with workplace deviance. Despite the arguments
drawn from Marasi’s (2014) study, points can be made for distributive justice to
moderate the relationship between pay communication and informational and procedural
justice instead. Empirical evidence from the performance-management literature
suggests, for example, that the performance-management process is viewed as less fair
procedurally (and informationally) when results are unfavorable to the employee, as it
might trigger self-defense mechanisms to reconcile the discrepancy between self-image
and rating (DeNisi & Kluger, 2000). The evidence implies that distributive justice
perceptions (e.g., performance ratings) have a profound impact on informational- and
procedural-justice perceptions of the instrument as a whole.
Apart from Marasi (2014), only Scheller and Harrison (2018) utilized a
commitment dimension (affective commitment) as an outcome variable in the context of
a pay communication study. Scheller and Harrison (2018) used a between-subjects
factorial design to test the effects of pay transparency, distributive justice, and
informational justice on pay satisfaction and affective commitment. In a study that
utilized case studies on an MTurk sample, participants experienced more significant
affective commitment when pay transparency was high. Additionally, the effects of pay
transparency on satisfaction were more pronounced when perceived distributive justice
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was low vs. high. This finding suggests that distributive and information justice could
influence potential outcome variables of pay communication in a mediation-moderation
fashion that Marasi and Bennett (2016) suggested in their conceptual piece. While the
study performed by Scheller and Harrison (2018) suffers from a few conceptual
weaknesses (pay communication was conceptualized as a dualistic variable, conceptual
hypotheses between transparency, justice perceptions, and the outcome variables were
linear and direct which leads to self-fulfilling prophecies), it provides an additional point
of evidence that the proposed model and interaction by Marasi and Bennett (2016) is
justifiable.

Situational Application and Research Questions
Before the effect of manager/employee conversations on employees can be
hypothesized, individual conversation components need to be unpacked first. Each
component by itself could individually impact employees’ perceptions of fairness in
different ways. The manager/employee conversation can be divided into four distinct
components: The communication of the amount of annual merit increase (1), the
provision of individual market-range percentages (2), the explanation of the changes to
the compensation system (3) and the explanation of the merit – increase decision that
combines the pay system information with individual performance throughout the year
(4). All of these four components have to be considered ineffective research design, even
though only component three and four (the explanation of the changes and how well
managers can explain their decision) seems to be firmly in scope as described earlier.
The variables to be included can be derived from the project question in combination
with the research overview. The pay communication literature suggests an interplay
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between pay-related information and organizational justice perceptions (Day, 2007;
Marasi, 2014; Noy, 2007). Organizational justice perceptions are firmly related to
outcomes of organizational interest:
Through the manager/employee conversations, managers have the opportunity to
influence certain employee perceptions directly. More specifically, managers’
explanations of the procedures and their availability to proactively provide information
and answering questions should directly impact employees’ perceptions of procedural
and informational justice because they provide valuable context for how a decision is
made, and upon what the decision is based. Thus, employees that received a
conversation with their manager overall should have higher perceptions of procedural and
informational justice.
Hypothesis 1a: Employees who had pay conversations with their managers will
have higher perceptions of procedural justice.
Hypothesis 1b: Employees who had pay conversations with their managers will
have higher perceptions of informational justice.
Building on the literature of pay communication, and the intentions of the
compensation department to release more pay-related information to employees, the
reception of the employee compensation statement should be included in the research
design. The compensation statement provides information on how employees’
compensation relates to external market conditions. Hence, it provides employees with
an external point of reference to base their referent-other comparison. Furthermore, it
provides managers with a foundation to put their increased decision in context. Based on
the research mentioned above on equity – theory and organizational justice perceptions,
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the compensation statement itself would be expected to have a positive impact on
procedural and informational justice perceptions. Also, one would expect this effect to
amplify when combined with manager/employee conversations, as it provides managers
with the opportunity to supplement the information presented on the statement with
further context. Distributive justice will only be influenced in situations where
employees received the statement and had manager/employee conversations because it is
the application of the information on the employee’s situation in the organization that
could influence whether employees feel fairly compensated. Without conversations,
employees will lack the context to make this inference.
Hypothesis 2a: Employees who did not have a manager conversation but received
a compensation statement have higher perceptions of procedural justice than
employees who did not receive anything.
Hypothesis 2b: Employees who did not have a manager conversation but received
a compensation statement have higher perceptions of informational justice than
employees who did not receive anything.
Hypothesis 2c: Employees who had a manager conversation AND received a
compensation statement will show higher levels of procedural justice than
employees who just had a conversation without receiving a statement.
Hypothesis 2d: Employees who had a manager conversation AND received a
compensation statement will show higher levels of informational justice than
employees who just had a conversation without receiving a statement.
Managers that have better conversations should see higher levels of perceptions of
procedural and informational justice when compared to managers that either does not
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exert the same effort or are not communicators of comparable quality. The main
recommended topics and best practices given to managers centers around the explanation
of the changes to the compensation system. Thus, being more successful relaying the
content to employees, which for this research was defined as “higher conversation
quality,” should positively relate to employees’ perceptions of procedural and
informational justice.
Employees' reactions to the conversation will, however, be influenced by the basepay decision itself. Depending on the perceived individual inputs and referent-other
comparisons, individual equity evaluations will result in a gamut of perceptions of
distributive justice (Tekleab, Bartol, & Liu, 2005). While managers are responsible for
the base-pay decision, the influence they have over perceptions of distributive justice
during the conversation itself is limited. Hence, distributive justice was used to control
for the effects of the decision itself on the quality of the conversation. Employees who
received a satisfactory decision will more likely rate the conversation quality as higher,
while employees that received a less satisfactory decision will feel more negative about
their conversation.
Hypothesis 3a: Conversation quality will be positively related to perceptions of
procedural justice, controlling for perceptions of distributive justice.
Hypothesis 3b: Conversation quality will be positively related to perceptions of
informational justice, controlling for perceptions of distributive justice.
Organizational justice perceptions should be related to employee engagement and
intent to stay if they are to validate the positive link between justice perceptions and
organizational outcomes.
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Hypothesis 4a: Higher perceptions of organizational justice will be positively
related to the organization’s definition of engagement.
Hypothesis 4b: Higher perceptions of organizational justice will be positively
related to the organization’s definition of intent to stay.

Figure 4
Proposed Relationships

CHAPTER 4
APPROACH
For this organizational research, data from two surveys were used to test the
hypotheses (see Figure 5). Most of the data stems from an employee survey that was
designed and conducted specifically for this research. Information on intent to stay and
organizational engagement was provided by the results of the enterprise-wide
engagement survey. Additional demographics required for specific analyses requested by
the client were pulled from the human resource system of record.

Figure 5
Measurement Design

Sample
A sample of 5000 employees was chosen for this research. A few considerations
determined the sample composition and size.
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While a random sample of a few hundred would have been sufficient for the
analysis to adhere to minimum N-size recommendations, the client wanted to retain the
capability to analyze results on the department level. Generally, the organization consists
mostly of one large department employing about one-third of all employees. The
remaining departments are smaller and varying in size. The author decided to
deliberately oversample to ensure that sample sizes are large enough to draw meaningful
conclusions from the results. The results were achieved by sampling 7500 randomly
chosen employees across all types of responsibilities, band levels, tenure groups, etc.
Then, about 2500 random employees from the largest department were removed from the
sample. As a result, the final sample of 5225 invited employees (cleaned for vicepresident or higher level of employees, attrition in the data, etc.) had a higher percentage
of employees from smaller departments. See Table 1 for illustration.
Concern around the frequency of employees who indicate not having received a
manager conversation also leads to increased sample size. It was the expectation of the
author as well as the compensation department that not having a conversation is an
incredibly rare occurrence. Thus, to make a comparison between the two groups, a
significant enough sample would be required to safeguard against low n sizes for rare
events.
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Table 1
Illustration of Sampling Technique Employed
Random sample of 5000 employees by
department
Department
n
% of total
A
3250
65.00%
B
100
2.00%
C
150
3.00%
D
250
5.00%
E
500
10.00%
F
600
12.00%
G
150
3.00%

Random sample of 7500 employees, removing
2000 from largest department
Department
n
% of total % increase
A (-2000)
2875 52.27%
-13.04%
B
150
2.73%
33.33%
C
225
4.09%
33.33%
D
375
6.82%
33.33%
E
750
13.64%
33.33%
F
900
16.36%
33.33%
G
225
4.09%
33.33%

Timing
The survey timing followed a deliberate sequence. The start date was about two
weeks after employees should have had their conversations with their managers. That
would give managers enough time to conduct their conversations, but it was close
enough, so employees were able to recall necessary details. After seven days,
nonresponsive employees were reminded to use their opportunity to participate. They
were reminded again on the morning of the last day of the survey period.
The enterprise-wide engagement survey was released a few weeks after the
closure of the research to provide another opportunity for engagement and to help
employees stay informed, thereby aiding this research.

Instruments
In this section, the instruments used to conduct this research are described. The
main focus of this section will be on the employee survey that was designed explicitly for
this purpose. Additional time will be spent discussing decisions, tradeoffs, and
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limitations that were faced by the author and how those limitations affected the outcomes
of the analysis.
Employee Survey
The employee survey consisted of 18 items divided into three sections. The first
section (two items) intended to measure which type of communication that had occurred
between the manager and the employee. Specifically, whether the employee had a
compensation conversation with their manager (Yes/No), and whether they had been
provided with a compensation statement (Yes/No), the newer document that
communicates necessary individual compensation information such as base salary,
individual market-range percentile, and base-pay increase to the employee.
The second section of the survey asked questions regarding the quality of the
manager/employee conversation. This 9-item section leaned on recommended topics and
best practices that were provided to managers and measured the extent to which
employees gained a good understanding of them during the conversation. Responses
were measured on a 5 – point Likert – scale. Employees who indicated that they did not
have a pay conversation with their manager did not receive this set of questions.
The third and final section consists of a loose adaptation of Colquitt’s (2001)
organizational Justice Scale. Colquitt’s organizational justice scale is a validated
instrument that has been frequently used in organizational justice research since its
creation. The scale synthesizes previously created measures of all four dimensions of
organizational justice in one scale that consists of 30 items. Using the entire scale,
however, was impractical in this context. From personal experience, focus groups, and
evaluation of organizational data, the author was aware that many employees perceive the
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frequency with which they are surveyed as too high and the length of each the surveys as
too long. The organization strives to make better decisions by employing data whenever
possible; this is inherently a worthwhile goal for which to strive. Much of the data that is
used to evaluate internal programs and processes originate from surveys administered to a
specific subset of employees. Not always are these surveys appropriately vetted by
subject matter experts with psychometric training or advanced consulting skills. The
results are surveys that sometimes lack focus, prioritization, and quality, which
contributes to perceived survey fatigue that manifests itself in lowered response rates.
In this environment, administering a 30-item scale to measure one construct with
four subdimensions is neither feasible nor politically or practically defensible. After a
quick analysis by the author, two items were selected from each of the distributive,
procedural, and informational justice subscales, rewritten for the research project, and
submitted to the client in a first draft. While this decision stands in contrast to
generalized recommendations of a minimum of three items per subdimension (Hinkin,
1995; Marsh, Hau, Balla, & Grayson, 1998), it supported the chances for approval of the
research in the first place and prevented fatigue and response bias in an already fatigued
organization which can be a real problem for researchers when scales become too long
(Hinkin, 1995). Moreover, employee perceptions in organizations can be a factor of
many influences that cannot be isolated well, or not at all in comparison to lab studies or
academic research that allows the researcher to control environmental factors (such as
rewards, motivators, etc.). Given the messiness that often accompanies research within
organizations, administering the full scale may have provided a false sense of
measurement accuracy that seems unwarranted. However, the decision for two-item
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measurements per construct is not without problems, as discussed. Hence, a post-hoc
factor analysis seemed appropriate to confirm the appropriate psychometric properties of
the revised instrument.
Another reason for the post hoc confirmation of the instrument stems from the
changes that were made to the original items to fit the situation and organizational
language. For example, the original scale item “Is your (outcome) justified, given your
performance?” was changed to “To what extent was the recent decision made about your
base pay reflective of your performance in 2018?”. During the inception phase of this
project, the client was made aware of the origin of the items, and that vast changes to the
recommended items would put the efficacy of the instrument at risk. The client displayed
a high understanding of these limitations and chose to keep changes as minimal as
possible. The rating-scale anchors were revised as well. Colquitt’s (2001) items are to
be rated on a 5-point scale ranging from “strongly disagree to strongly agree.” While the
5-point scale was retained, participants rated on answer options ranging from “to a very
small extent” to “a very large extent.” This change allowed the author to keep anchors
consistent across the survey, which was intended to improve the user experience for
participants. Different designs and scales require different amounts of interpretative
efforts by the participant to translate their response into the response options provided by
the instrument (DeCastellarnau, 2018). By keeping response options consistent
throughout the survey, the author also attempts to keep the required amount of
interpretative effort to a minimum.
Post administration, reliability of each justice dimension was assessed
individually. Cronbach alphas were α = 0.895 for distributive justice, α = 0.753 for
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procedural justice, and α = 0.863 for informational justice, indicating acceptable
reliability (Cortina, 1993). Given the magnitude of changes, a confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA) was conducted post-hoc to confirm the factor structure of the
measurement. A CFI value of0 0.958 and an SRMR of 0.039 indicates a good model fit
in line with recommendations by Hu and Bentler (1999). An RMSEA of 0.193 violates
these guidelines and indicates at least some issues. RMSEA has shown to be sensitive to
sample size and simpler models with low degrees of freedom. Since the model includes
three factors with two items each, the degrees of freedom of six are low. The RMSEA,
along with the TLI, are also dependent on the chi-square value. With a large sample size,
higher correlations among measures, chi-square values are high (this model has a chisquare value of 82.80). Thus, a low ratio of items to factors and a high chi-square value
negatively influence the RMSEA and result in poor model fit (Kenny, Kaniskan, &
McCoach, 2015). With the SRMR (that is not dependent on chi-square values) and the
CFI adhering to the recommended guidelines, the data is still suitable for this study. See
Table 2 for a comparison between the observed goodness of fit values and Hu and
Bentler’s (1999) criteria.

Table 2
Goodness of Fit Criteria
Fit Index
CFI
TLI
RMSEA
SRMR
*Hu & Bentler, 1999

Cutoff Criteria*
0.95
0.95
0.06
0.08

Observed Value
0.958
0.895
0.193
0.039
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Engagement Survey
The engagement survey is administered to all employees across the enterprise on
an annual basis. Engagement is measured with five items and is following a unique
organization-specific definition of the construct that differs from academic definitions
such as Kahn (1990) and Schaufeli, Salanova, González-Romá, and Bakker (2002).
While individual items of the scale cannot be discussed due to confidentiality, it is the
opinion of the author that items utilized seem more aligned with affective organizational
commitment. Relationships of the organizational definition of engagement to critical
organizational outcomes (such as measures of productivity) have been validated
internally in 2014 and 2019 in internal analyses.
Additionally, intent to stay was measured with one item only. While a one-item
measure can be problematic because of many reasons, there is evidence that one-item
measures may suffice when constructs are very narrowly defined (e.g., Bergkvist &
Rossiter, 2007). The argument can be made that intent to stay is such a narrowly defined
construct. The relationship of the intent to stay measurement and organizational turnover
has been analyzed and internally validated in 2014 and 2019 as well.

Demographics
Additional demographics necessary for the analysis of specific client questions
were acquired from the HR systems of record, by appending this information to the data,
allowing for the breakout of justice perceptions by market quartiles, actual pay increase,
departments, and other factors that aid the utility of the collected data to the client. For
the protection of personally identifiable information, no individual demographics besides
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actual pay increases grouped into nine increase groups were retained above and beyond
the research-survey data and the first six items of the organizational engagement survey.

Data Analysis
Data Cleaning
Missing data is a pervasive problem in data analysis. When data are missing at
random, deleting, or excluding cases from the analysis is a viable solution (Tabachnick &
Fidell, 2018). Missing data were not expected to be an issue that could undermine the
efficacy to run statistical procedures for hypothesis testing due to the large sample size.
Data were missing at random with no observed patterns. Thus, the decision was made to
remove incomplete cases from the analysis. In total, 96 cases were removed, which
represents roughly 4.3% of all cases.
Data Analysis
Multiple different analysis techniques were utilized. Independent-sample t-tests
are used to test Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b 2c, and 2d. Hierarchical regression was used to
test Hypothesis 3, and linear regression was used to test Hypothesis 4. Accordingly,
when any individual effect is being reported, please note that it should be assumed that all
other entered variables are being held constant.

CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
Data Preparation
Of 5225 invited employees, 2230 responded, which represents a response rate of
42.7%. Total scores were computed for distributive, procedural, and informational
justice by the addition of the raw scores for each sub-dimension. An exploratory analysis
was conducted on the total justice scores to examine the normality of the distribution.
Guidelines on limits of normality vary from the use of fixed rules of thumb (George &
Mallery, 2016; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2018) to the use of significance testing using zscores (Field, 2013; Howell, 2012). However, Field (2013) noted that significance tests
should not be used in large samples (like this study) because they are likely to be
significant even though distributions approach normality. Tabachnick and Fidell (2018)
recommend a range from + 1.5 to -1.5 for skewness and kurtosis to be considered normal.
George and Mallery (2016) recommend a range of + 2.0 to -2.0. Skewness and kurtosis
for all three total scores stayed within these limits, with kurtosis of -1.15 for distributive
justice being the most extreme value. A visual inspection of the histograms displays a
normal-looking distribution for procedural and informational justice with a high
concentration of higher values at the top end of the distribution. The distribution of
distributive justice shows a more even distribution across response ranges.
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Q-Q plots do not show any information that would lead to the conclusion that the
distribution of normality is an issue. Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests both
returned significant, indicating non-normal solutions. Despite these results, independent
sample t-tests were used to assess Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d because
these tests of normality are reactive to larger sample sizes and because t-tests are
considered to be robust when larger samples are used (Field, Miles, & Field, 2012).
The absence of outliers was assessed by computing a Mahalanobis distance for
each case, using informational and procedural justice as dependent variables, and by
running a chi-square test on the Mahalanobis distance values to determine the p level.
Per recommendation by Tabachnick and Fidell (2018), a critical value p < 0.001 was
applied to create a cutoff. Cases that violated the threshold for either procedural or
informational justice were removed from the data. As a result, 94 cases were removed.
Multicollinearity was assessed by assessing the variance inflation factors (VIF)
for all continuous, independent variables used in this study. Across the literature, a wide
array of recommendations is given for acceptable VIF values, ranging from five to 15. In
the analysis for Multicollinearity, no VIF value exceeded 4.32. Thus, no
multicollinearity was detected (see Table 3).
Homoscedasticity was assessed by examining the residuals on a scatterplot. From
the observation, residuals are evenly distributed across a regression line. Thus, it can be
concluded that the assumption of homoscedasticity is met (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2018).

Table 3
Mean, Standard Deviation and Correlations of Observed and Latent Constructs and Covariates
Variable
Conversation Content

0M

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

1. Market Range 1

03.66

1.03

-

2. Market Range 2

03.23

1.23

0.67*

3. Market Range 3

03.07

1.24

0.67* 0.83*

4. Market Range 4

03.31

1.20

0.66* 0.71* 0.82*

5. Total Rewards

03.76

1.22

0.54* 0.49* 0.52* 0.57*

6. Decision Factors

03.44

1.22

0.53* 0.67* 0.64* 0.58* 0.50*

7. Performance

03.57

1.22

0.45* 0.52* 0.52* 0.52* 0.43* 0.74*

8. Ask Questions

03.77

1.17

0.43* 0.55* 0.51* 0.50* 0.46* 0.72* 0.71*

9. Answ. Questions

03.48

1.31

0.40* 0.51* 0.48* 0.49* 0.40* 0.68* 0.74* 0.79*

06.42

2.69

0.28* 0.34* 0.32* 0.37* 0.27* 0.48* 0.63* 0.55* 0.67*

11. Procedural Justice

07.01

2.34

0.38* 0.47* 0.44* 0.46* 0.38* 0.61* 0.69* 0.71* 0.76* 0.79*

12. Informational Justice

07.24

2.42

0.38* 0.49* 0.44* 0.46* 0.38* 0.64* 0.72* 0.70* 0.76* 0.78* 0.88*

13. Engagement

20.78

3.31

0.20* 0.25* 0.26* 0.27* 0.22* 0.33* 0.35* 0.34* 0.40* 0.40* 0.44* 0.42*

14. Intend to Stay

04.33

0.88

0.12* 0.17* 0.19* 0.15* 0.13* 0.23* 0.24* 0.25* 0.29* 0.30* 0.23* 0.33* 0.66*
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0.67* 0.67* 0.66* 0.54* 0.53* 0.45* 0.43* 0.40* 0.28* 0.38* 0.38* 0.20* 0.12*
-

0.83* 0.71* 0.49* 0.67* 0.52* 0.55* 0.51* 0.34* 0.47* 0.49* 0.25* 0.17*
-

0.82* 0.52* 0.64* 0.52* 0.51* 0.48* 0.32* 0.44* 0.44* 0.26* 0.19*
-

0.57* 0.58* 0.52* 0.50* 0.49* 0.37* 0.46* 0.46* 0.27* 0.15*
-

0.50* 0.43* 0.46* 0.40* 0.27* 0.38* 0.38* 0.22* 0.13*
-

0.74* 0.72* 0.68* 0.48* 0.61* 0.64* 0.33* 0.23*
-

0.71* 0.74* 0.63* 0.69* 0.72* 0.35* 0.24*
-

0.79* 0.55* 0.71* 0.70* 0.34* 0.25*
-

0.67* 0.76* 0.76* 0.40* 0.29*

Covariates
10. Distributive Justice

-

0.79* 0.78* 0.40* 0.30*

Outcome Variables
-

0.88* 0.44* 0.23*
-

0.42* 0.33*
-

0.66*
-

*p < .001; Nmin = 1731; Nmax = 2037
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Conversation Impact on Perceptions of Procedural
and Informational Justice
An independent sample t-test was used to evaluate whether manager
conversations had an impact on perceptions of procedural and informational justice.
There was a significant difference in procedural justice perception scores between
employees who did (M = 7.14, SD = 2.26), and did not (M = 4.01, SD = 2.11) receive an
annual pay conversation with their manager, t (2109) = 12.99, p < .001. The equal
variance was assumed as Leven’s test was not significant. Effect size was found to be
very large (d = 1.43) using Sawilowsky’s (2009) criteria (very small d = 0.1, small d =
0.2, medium d = 0.5, large d = 0.8, very large d = 1.2, huge d = 2.0) that meaningfully
expand Cohen’s (1988) original suggested interpretation. These results suggest that
having a manager conversation is associated with higher perceptions of procedural
justice. Hypothesis 1a was supported.
For informational justice, there was a significant difference in justice perception
scores between employees who did (M = 7.38, SD = 2.32), and did not (M = 4.16, SD =
2.48) receive an annual pay conversation with their manager, t (2116) = 12.90, p < .001.
The equal variance was assumed as Leven’s test was not significant. The effect size was
found to be very large (d = 1.34) (Sawilowsky, 2009). These results suggest that having
a manager conversation is associated with higher perceptions of informational justice.
Thus, Hypothesis 1b was supported.
An independent sample t-test was used to evaluate whether receiving
compensation statements affected employees that did not have manager conversations on
perceptions of procedural and informational justice. There was a significant difference in
procedural justice perception scores between employees who did (M = 4.67, SD = 2.30),

46
and did not (M = 3.64, SD = 1.92) receive a compensation statement, t (89) = 2.29, p <
0.05. The equal variance was assumed as Levene’s test was not significant. The effect
size was found to be moderate (d = 0.49) (Sawilowsky, 2009). These results suggest that
just receiving a compensation statement without actually having a manager conversation
positively influences perceptions of procedural justice (see Table 4). Thus, Hypothesis 2a
was supported. Effects on informational justice, however, returned nonsignificant
Hypothesis 2b was not supported.

Table 4
N-size, Mean, Standard Deviation of Hypothesis 1
Variable
Procedural Justice

Manager Conversation Yes/No
Yes
No

n
2020
0091

M
7.14
4.01

SD
2.26
2.11

Informational Justice

Yes
No

2027
0091

7.38
4.16

2.32
2.48

An independent sample t-test was used to evaluate whether receiving
compensation statements affected employees that had manager conversations on
perceptions of procedural and informational justice. There was a significant difference in
procedural justice perception scores between employees who did (M = 7.26, SD = 2.21),
and did not (M = 5.97, SD = 2.39) receive a compensation statement, t (2018) = 7.36, p <
.001. The equal variance was assumed as Leven’s test was not significant. The effect
size was found to be moderate (d = 0.56) (Sawilowsky, 2009). Hypothesis 2c was
supported.
There was also a significant difference in informational justice perception scores
between employees who did (M = 7.51, SD = 2.25), and did not (M = 5.98, SD = 2.54)
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receive a compensation statement, t (204.80) = 7.80, p < .001. Leven’s test was
significant, so equal variance was not assumed. The observed effect size was found to be
moderate (d = 0.64) (Sawilowsky, 2009). Hypothesis 2d was supported. Receiving a
compensation statement while having a manager conversation does moderately influence
perceptions of informational and procedural justice.

Conversation Quality and Perceptions of Procedural
and Informational Justice
Two two-stage hierarchical regressions were conducted to assess whether
manager conversation quality influences perceptions of procedural and informational
justice, controlling for distributive justice. Conversation quality consists of nine items
developed to reflect the recommended topics and best practices. Distributive justice was
entered in Step 1 as a control variable, followed by the conversation quality items in Step
2. Items were not aggregated since their creation was purely based on recommended
topics and best practices provided by the compensation department and are not part of a
validated scale.
For procedural justice, the hierarchical regression showed that distributive justice
contributed significantly to the regression model (F (1, 1966) = 3192.37, p< 0.001), and
accounted for 61.9% of the variation in perceptions of procedural justice. Adding the
conversation quality items to the regression explained an additional 13.4% of the
variation. This change was significant (F (10, 1957) = 595.07, p< 0.001). Thus,
conversation quality positively influenced procedural justice perceptions of employees
regarding the pay decision. However, out of nine conversation quality items, only four
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items returned significant. Hypothesis 3a was supported. See Table 5 for full regression
results.
For informational justice, the results of the hierarchical regression showed similar
results. Once again, distributive justice contributed significantly to perceptions of
informational justice (F (1, 1971) = 2943.54, p< .001), and explained 59.9% of the
variance. Adding the conversation quality items added 15.0% of the explained variance.
The increase was significant (F (10, 1962) = 585.96, p< .001). Thus, conversation
quality positively influenced perceptions of informational justice. Out of the nine
conversation items, six items returned, showing significance. Given the results,
Hypothesis 3b was also supported. See Table 6 for full regression results.

Table 5
Hierarchical Regression Results of Procedural Justice
Unstandardized
coefficients
Step

Predictor

-B

SE

Standardized
coefficients
ß
p

1
Distributive Justice
2

-.407

.013

-.481

R2

R2 change

F

p

.619

.619

3192.37

.000***

.751

.134

0595.07

.000***

.000***

1. Market Range 1
2. Market Range 2
3. Market Range 3
4. Market Range 4
5. Total Rewards
6. Decision Factors
7. Performance
8. Ask Questions
9. Answ. Questions

-.001
.973
-.001
.037
-.060
.006**
-.111
.040
-.042
.095
-.077
.046
-.026
.217
-.049
.040
-.260
.074
-.048
.027
-.010
.672
-.019
.039
-.053
.009**
-.099
.038
-.230
.000***
-.444
.040
-.038
.000***
-.302
.038
Outcome: Procedural Justice, N = 1967, SE = Standard Error of B. * = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001
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Table 6
Hierarchical Regression Results of Informational Justice
Unstandardized
coefficients
Step

Predictor

B

SE

Standardized
coefficients
ß
p

1
Distributive Justice
2

-.379

.012

-.774

R2

R2 change

F

p

.599

.599

2943.535

.000***

.748

.150

585.960

.000***

.000***

1. Market Range 1
2. Market Range 2
3. Market Range 3
4. Market Range 4
5. Total Rewards
6. Decision Factors
7. Performance
8. Ask Questions
9. Answ. Questions

-.008
.636
-.180
.038
-.086
.000***
-.163
.041
-.063
.001**
-.156
.047
-.028
.185
-.055
.041
-.006
.681
-.012
.028
-.084
.000***
-.160
.040
-.125
.000***
-.239
.039
-.148
.000***
-.294
.041
-.191
.000***
-.338
.039
Outcome: Informational Justice, N = 1972, SE = Standard Error of B. * = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001

50

51
Overall Perceptions of Justice and Organizational Outcomes
Perceptions of distributive, procedural, and informational justice were
aggregated into one organizational justice score by creating a sum of each item. Since
each dimension of organizational justice was measured with two items, distributive,
procedural, and informational justice are represented equally in the overall score. This
procedure was supported by evidence from the confirmatory factor analysis; after the
inclusion of a higher-order factor to the measurement model, the fit indices did not
change.
Scientifically, the procedure is supported by findings from Colquitt and Shaw
(2005). They demonstrated that each of the four justice dimensions has a strong factor
loading when aggregated to a latent “organizational justice” construct. While few
studies had used organizational justice in this fashion (e.g., Liao, 2007) Fassina, Jones,
and Uggerslev (2008) noted that such an approach would be feasible if the focus of the
prediction is on the shared justice variance in an outcome, as it is the case for
Hypothesis 4 (Colquitt, 2012)
Linear regression was conducted to investigate the relationship between
perceptions of organizational justice and the organizational engagement variable as
defined by the company. The regression was significant (F (1, 1788) = 443.88,
p< .001). Overall, perceptions of organizational justice explained 19.8% of the variance
in engagement. Hypothesis 4a was supported.
Additionally, a linear regression was used to examine the relationship between
organizational justice and intent to stay. The regression was significant
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(F (1, 1788) = 238.99, p< .001). Overall, perceptions of organizational justice explained
11.7% in variance in intent to stay. Thus, Hypothesis 4b was also supported.

CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION
Implications
Results empirically showed that manager/employee pay conversations are a useful
tool to positively influence employees’ perceptions about the base-pay increase process
and the information they receive. Perceptions of informational and procedural justice of
employees without a conversation was substantially lower, as demonstrated by the large
effect size. The number of employees without a conversation was small, with roughly
5% being affected, but it still seems like a missed opportunity that warrants a closer look.
One potential explanation for managers not having a conversation with their employees
could be the avoidance of having to communicate negative news, or not seeing the need
to have a conversation if the pay does not change at all.
Actual pay increases, expressed in percentile, were formed into nine groups to
evaluate this hypothesis; Group 1 received little to no increase, and Group 9 received
more than a 5% increase. The distribution revealed that for employees without a
conversation, 41.1% received either no or very little pay increase while the percentage is
20.4% for employees that had a conversation. The finding provides further support for
the hypothesis that some managers either avoid or do not see the need to have a
conversation when no or little increase is given. However, alternative explanations
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cannot be excluded from the evidence presented. It is also possible that managers were
unable to schedule time, had employees on leave of absences, or that other circumstances
prevented a conversation. In those cases, we would expect the distribution across payincrease groups to be approaching the distribution of the overall population. The fact that
the group that makes for the least desirable conversation is heavily over-represented
speaks to a non-random component within the data. The evidence of this study suggests
that not having a manager-/employee conversation is a missed opportunity: When the
data is filtered for employees in increase Group 1, only t-tests still reveal a significant,
strong effect for procedural justice (d = 1.02) and informational justice (d = 0.89). Thus,
managers should have a pay conversation even when the decision itself is unfavorable for
the employee.
Another important client question centers around recommended talking points and
best practices that are provided to managers, and whether those items are useful in
influencing employees’ perceptions. For procedural justice, only four out of nine
recommended topics & best practices were significant in influencing employees’
perceptions. Specifically, whether employees were able to ask questions and whether
those questions were answered satisfactorily had the most significant impact, followed by
the explanation of how individual performance factored into the ultimate base-pay
decision. Recommended topics and best practices that aimed at explaining the new
changes and guardrails of the compensation system to employees were mostly
nonsignificant. Only the explanation of the new market-range metric, which was also part
of the compensation statement, was significant. From a procedural justice perspective,
these results seem to make sense: three of the six Leventhal criteria (Leventhal, 1980) of
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procedural justice are involvement in the decision-making, consistency of procedures,
and bias suppression (Colquitt et al., 2001). While involvement in the decision-making is
relatively unlikely, having the opportunity to ask questions and having these questions
answered clarifies the procedure and provides the employee with the relevant information
to decide whether consistency and unbiased decision-making occurred. Additionally, it
provides an opportunity to the employee to voice his or her feelings of the decision,
which fosters acceptance of the process which is the 4th of the six Leventhal criteria
(Leventhal, 1980; Leventhal et al., 1980) for procedures to be perceived as fair.
For informational justice, six out of nine recommended topics and best practices
were significant. Similar to procedural justice, asking questions, and having questions
answered satisfactorily were the strongest predictors, followed by understanding how
individual performance factored into the base-pay decision. Additionally, having all the
factors that went into the base-pay decision explained was a significant predictor as well
as the explanation of market ranges. This new information also appears on the
compensation statement. One item, self-evaluation of the understanding of the concept of
market ranges, was a significant negative predictor. While a possible explanation could
be that understanding the metric well could potentially raise more questions about its
computations, which introduces more awareness of potential shortcomings, it is more
likely that this could be a sign of a suppression effect (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2018). A
simple correlation between this item and procedural justice was positive and thus in
direct conflict to the results from the regression.
From a statistical perspective, using nine predictors in the same step of a
hierarchical regression is not without problems. The concern is that predictors cause a
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suppression effect where some predictors suppress variance that is otherwise unrelated to
the dependent variable. One indicator of a suppression effect is a sign of a regression
weight of a predictor that is the opposite of what one would expect (Tabachnick & Fidell,
2018). Such indicators are observed in Predictor 1 for procedural justice, and Predictor 1
and 3 for informational justice, although correlations for both variables with the outcome
are positive. Additionally, Predictor 3 is significant for procedural justice. To
appropriately address the concern, all recommended topics, and best practices around
market ranges were aggregated to one factor. This aggregation seems justifiable since the
aggregated variables stem from the same content space. Reliability analysis revealed that
Cronbach alphas for these four variables were quite good (α = 0.915). On top,
confirmatory factor analysis was used to assess whether variables indeed tab into the
same content space. The goodness of fit indices were all within the recommended ranges
for Hu and Bentler (1999), except for the RMSEA for issues already discussed (CFI =
.985, TLI = .955, SRMR = .020, RMSEA = .142). Thus, the regression analysis was
rerun with this aggregated predictor, limiting the numbers of predictors added in Step 2
from nine to five. The overall results of the regression did not change. For individual
predictors, the new combined market range variable was significant for procedural justice
(p< 0.05) with beta weights that were quite small (B = 0.020; ß = 0.037). While small
effects can have a significant impact in a large organization, this result should be
interpreted with caution because a p-value of just below 0.05 with ample statistical power
from the sample size of +2000 observations seems insufficient to have full confidence in
the result.
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For informational justice, the new aggregated market range variable was not
significant. The reason this approach was not chosen for the primary analysis if the study
is connected to client reporting concerns. This research aimed at providing the client
with a comprehensive picture of which recommended topics and best practices support
the goal of positively influencing employee’s fairness perceptions of the process.
Reporting back to the client on an aggregated predictor is potentially more ambiguous to
report, to explain, and potentially raises more questions, so the approach with nine
predictors was chosen.
Similar concerns also influenced a different research-design decision of this
study. Hypotheses 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d were analyzed using several independent t-tests. In
psychological research, a MANOVA would be more appropriate in this situation. Due to
the complexity of conducting and reporting a MANOVA, specifically in the
organizational context, the approach, as mentioned above, was chosen. However, a
MANOVA offers greater statistical power over multiple independent t-tests, so the
decision was made to re-evaluate results from Hypothesis 2 using the more sophisticated
statistical analysis. Results of the two-way MANOVA showed a significant effect on
manager conversations on procedural and informational justice (see Table 7). The effects
of the compensation statement were nonsignificant. The interaction effect of the manager
conversation and the compensation statement was nonsignificant as well. The likely
conclusion is that the compensation statement does not add positively to the perceptions
of procedural and informational justice above and beyond the manager/employee
conversation. Post-hoc two-way ANOVAs reveal that the results do not differ for
procedural and informational justice. Caution should be exercised in treating these
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results as definitive; however, as the sample size for some of the combinations of
independent variables is an issue. For example, only 34 employees in the sample received
a compensation statement without receiving a manager conversation. Given the
observable difference in mean scores demonstrated for Hypothesis 2, the nonsignificant
interaction effect of the MANOVA may be a product of low statistical power. An
evaluation using GPower (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang; 2009) for post-hoc
MANOVA analysis given an error probability of α = 0.05 revealed a statistical power of
ß = 0.32, well below the required threshold of 0.80 recommended by Cohen (1992),
confirming inadequate sample size. Thus, the role of the compensation statement cannot
be solved conclusively (see Table 7).

Table 7
MANOVA Results
Predictor
λ
Hypothesis df
Intercept
2
0.925
Conversation_1_0
2
0.977
Statement_1_0
2
0.998
Conversation_1_0*
2
Statement_1_0
0.999
DV: Informational & Procedural Justice, * = p<.001

Error df
2098
2098
2098
2098

F
84.769
24.205
2.257
1.158

Sig.
0.000*
0.000*
0.105
0.314

Recommendations
Based on this research, a handful of recommendations were made to the
compensation department. First, we have demonstrated that not having a pay
conversation is a lost opportunity to soften the effects of unfavorable pay decisions.
Managers who avoid the conversation are not behaving in the best interest of the
organization. In more definite terms, they are displaying bad people management
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practices. Given the damaging effects of not explaining decisions and practices to
employees on organizational engagement and intent to stay, managers need to go out of
their way to make these conversations happen. Additionally, the study demonstrated that
investing energy and effort into the conversations is worthwhile to boost perceptions even
further.
The latest guidelines recommended that managers should focus a reasonable
amount of time explaining the changes to the compensation guardrails to employees more
carefully. As already explained, most of these recommended topics and best practices
have shown to be ineffective in improving employees’ perceptions of procedural and
informational justice, and thus, making these topics the main focus point does not seem
the most effective strategy. Instead, it was recommended that managers summarize the
pay-increase system but shift quickly to focus the conversation on explaining the
employee’s contributions and how they influenced their decision. Additionally, ample
time should be given to the employee to ask questions to make sure everything is
adequately explained. However, managers need to be prepared to explain the base-payincrease system in detail when being asked by the employee.
The role of compensation statements as a strategy to elevate employee’s
perceptions of informational justice couldn’t be illuminated conclusively. There are
indicators that statements may have a small to medium positive effect on procedural and
informational justice perceptions at best or don’t contribute anything at worst. Thus,
there is no harm in continuing the practice, primarily since statements are automatically
generated. As described, there is no consensus in the pay communication literature on
whether providing more pay-related information is beneficial or detrimental to an
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organization’s workforce (Colella et al., 2007). Some of the initial evidence gathered in
this study seems to indicate that a moderate increase in transparency may result in more
beneficial perceptions of informational justice, even though this statement cannot be
conclusively proven with the information at hand.

Follow-Up Research
The results of this study provided the foundation for follow up research that aided
the understanding of employee reactions to the annual pay-increase process. For
example, detailed results by demographic and organizational variables were provided to
the compensation department that enabled them to understand how specific groups that
were more affected by the changes to the pay increase responded and whether their
responses indeed lead to an increase in turnover. On a more general note, this research
proved to the organization that there is value in using the science-practitioner model to
make Human Resources a more data-driven operation.

Limitations
The first limitation of the study concerns the measurement of organizational
justice. Colquitt (2001) constructed the most widely used scale of organizational justice
totaling 16 items to measure distributive, procedural, and informational justice. For
reasons explained, the present study only uses two items per factor, thus, deviating
substantially from the original instrument. As a consequence, perceptions of distributive,
procedural, and informational justice are not fully captured from a scientific perspective.
The most obvious case is procedural justice. As discussed, Leventhal (1980) created six
criteria for a procedure to be called “fair;” all of them very distinct components. For this
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research, only two out of these six criteria were captured in the instrument (accurate
information, and opportunity to express views and feelings), leaving four criteria
unmeasured. Relative statements regarding employees’ perception (e.g., whether they
experience an increase, decrease) can be drawn from the research. However, the measure
is deficient in making absolute statements on the base-pay-increase process overall. The
same, albeit less severe, limitations apply to results for informational and distributive
justice. The latter factor is the least affected by these limitations for several reasons.
First, the original scale only consists of four items, which makes it the shortest subscale.
Second, Colquitt’s (2001) confirmatory factor analysis showed that three of the four
items have very high, similar factor loadings. From these three items, one was included
in our survey together with the fourth item from the original scale that seems to function
a bit differently from the other three. Thus, confidence can be had that the two selected
items cover a reasonable amount of variance of the full construct.
The second limitation concerns the common method bias for Hypotheses 1 to 3.
Common-method bias refers to measurement error that is caused by common-method
variance, that is, variance attributable to the measurement of the constructs rather than the
constructs themselves (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Results for
Hypotheses 1 to 3 may be influenced by this type of bias since they originate from the
same survey. Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values during data preparation showed that
multicollinearity assumptions were met within reasonable thresholds. That alone is not
enough to exclude the presence of common method bias, a cause of error that is difficult
to control for outside of the research design itself (Podsakoff et al., 2003). As a result,
care was being exercised during the interpretation of results with small effect sizes,
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observable in the discussion of the value of compensation statements (Hypothesis 2), and
the role of market range talking points (Hypothesis 3).
Another limitation of the study is the measure of the organizational outcome,
engagement. The organization’s definition of work engagement differs substantially
from suggested definitions provided by the literature (e.g., Kahn, 1990; Macey &
Schneider, 2008; Schaufeli et al., 2002). The scale that is used to assess this unique
definition of engagement has some material weaknesses such as inconsistent factor
loadings, one-item measures for sub-criteria, and lack of variance for some items, among
others. These conceptual and practical deficiencies undermine the capability to detect
consistent relationships between concepts that should otherwise be (theoretically) related
by introducing additional noise into the statistical procedure.

Conclusion
The purpose of this project was to determine whether manager/employee pay
conversations are effective in influencing employee’s perceptions of procedural and
informational justice. The evidence gathered in this study provided substantial support
for the effectiveness of the practice and yielded particular conversation content
recommendations that support the practice and effort to improve pay conversations in the
organization continuously. Additionally, the importance of good pay conversations has
been demonstrated by linking justice perceptions to organizational outcomes such as
engagement and intent to stay. However, the topic of drivers of successful pay
conversations has not been explored to a full extent yet. Future research can expand by
finding more conversation-related predictors of procedural and informational justice such
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as discretionary manager effort during the conversation, or the communication of other
compensation systems.
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